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CHaPitre 9  
a Personal report on Methodological 
Developments in US Law
Stephen UtZ
Professor, School of Law, University of Connecticut
i. introduction
a survey of contemporary legal research in the United States must 
to some extent be personal and impressionistic . No one can see the 
entire landscape or has the expertise to evaluate everything in it . 
the pitfall of myopia is heightened by the enormous variety of cur-
rent methods and results, the need to mention and evaluate areas 
of specialty in which things are going well or poorly, and publica-
tion biases that should not influence content but inevitably do . the 
already huge variety of books, journals, and commercial guides to 
particular legal subjects has been overshadowed by an uncountable 
array of electronically circulated working papers, blogs, symposia, 
and conference proceedings . With that disclaimer, what follows is 
my own view of what legal scholarship in the USa is like at the 
present moment .
ii. An anti-systematic background
at the outset, it is useful to note that, in comparison with the 
legal literature of countries with code-based law, those of the United 
States and other common law countries seem reluctant to address 
problems of legal methodology directly . Our default approach has 
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been to rely on the shared attitudes and techniques of exegesis we 
all learn in a relatively inarticulate fashion in the first year of law 
school . Generally, my legal compatriots are not particularly conscious 
that they might do more in this respect and that the failure to do so 
can harm otherwise expert reasoning about the law . Nevertheless, the 
USa has consistently produced a small but interesting literature on 
distinctive issues of legal interpretation . recently, that literature has 
taken on a wider array of methodological puzzles and has begun to 
exercise a distinctive influence on the judiciary and the community 
of practicing lawyers as well as on academic lawyers who are not 
primarily methodologists .
a wider theoretical background in the USa partly accounts for 
the relatively little time devoted here to specific puzzles about legal 
reasoning . influential shifts in american legal thought – big move-
ments associated with prominent legal thinkers like the american 
Legal realists or the inventors of Critical Legal Studies – have cap-
tured the high ground of public attention, leaving the task of survey-
ing how law works in detail to languish . We seem instead to regard 
comprehensive effort to understand law in all its branches as tedious, 
the easy domain of retired judges and commercial digest authors .
another influence that has diverted our attention from methodol-
ogy is that of traditional legal pedagogy . the once-prevailing style 
of teaching law in the United States, the “case method,” shaped all 
thinking here about interpretation of the law for almost a century . 
Harvard Law School invented this method while inventing itself as the 
domestic standard of an academically ambitious professional school 
for lawyers, influenced to a great extent by German universities’ rec-
ognition of the “science” of law . Using case-intensive discussion of 
legal rules, the instructor could adopt a posture of agnosticism as to 
the reasoning and holdings of particular cases, leaving it to students 
to construct their own views on these matters . in this respect, the 
case method became emblematic of a kind of skepticism about the 
need for broad vision and generality . it left generations of american 
lawyers with the lesson that one could get along perfectly well with-
out a self-conscious understanding of legal methodology .
More theoretically minded early law professors quickly lent their 
support to a debunking and castigation of “formalism,” which with 
hindsight we can recognize not to have been a genuinely shared 
view of earlier lawyers or lawyer academics, but an invented oppo-
nent of right thinking . H .L .a . Hart, writing roughly 60 years after 
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the first attacks on formalism, labeled the attackers “rule skeptics”1 . 
He treated them gently, in examining their arguments and the weak-
nesses of their conclusions, but the label was itself a sort of revela-
tion : it pointed to the movement’s lack of constructive conclusions . 
anti-formalism itself gave way to another, slightly less skeptical 
movement in law teaching, associated with the term “legal process”2 . 
But during and after the Viet Nam War, radical skepticism of the 
content of judicial decisions, focusing on american courts, arose . 
the Critical Legal Studies Movement and related movements that 
draw on some of the same hermeneutic criticism of the law revived 
the american Legal realists’ broad-brush doubts about legal insti-
tutions3 . Finally, over the last decade or so, a new generation of 
legal methodologists has emerged among US legal scholars . they 
have called stressed problems of legal reasoning, some of which the 
“Crits” also recognized, but have proposed less far-reaching diagno-
ses of the sources of these problems .
as a renewed interest in constructive legal methodology has come 
to the fore, criticisms of “critical” theories of the law have arisen 
as well . earlier skeptical accounts of how law works are being sup-
planted by more affirmative accounts . Some of the more recent work 
on legal methodology relies on specialized theories developed in lin-
guistics and formal logic, as tools for understanding how statutes and 
rules derived from case law should be interpreted .
Judges and practicing lawyers have long complained that aca-
demic legal scholarship – especially, law review articles – have little 
relevance to their work . this may partly account for the emergence 
of a large number of sophisticated legal journals, the content and 
editorial procedures of which contrast sharply with those of law-
school-based law reviews . Despite their practice orientation, these 
legal journals publish works of higher quality than was typical of 
similar practitioner-edited journals thirty years ago . they are, how-
ever, well attuned to judicial and practitioner interests .
1 . H .L .a . Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press 1961 ; 
2d  ed . 1997, ch .7 .
2 . H . M . Hart Jr . and a . M . Sacks, The Legal Process : Basic Problems in 
the Making and Application of Law, New York : Foundation Press, 1956 ; S .  Utz, 
Problems in american Legal Methodology, in Rechtsgeschäft, Methodenlehre, und 
Darüber Hinaus : Liber Amicorum für Detlef Leenen, Berlin, C .H . Beck, 2012 .
3 . D . Kennedy, “Form & Substance in Private Law adjudication”, 89 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1685, 1976 .
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Beneath the radar, however, it must be emphasized that legal aca-
demics now embrace a far less abstract approach to teaching their 
subject matter . there is currently a vogue for more experiential teach-
ing – for the use of various forms of simulation exercises in what 
previously were strictly verbal investigations of legal content . even 
philosophers of law are often prepared to take their students to court-
houses for a glimpse of what practicing lawyers do well (or not) .
iii. A diversity of platforms
For many american lawyers, the term “law review” means a legal 
journal published by a law school, often without limitation to a spe-
cific area of the law . this kind of law review became prevalent 
during the early decades of the twentieth century, when the Harvard 
method to legal instruction, referred to above, was taking hold as 
the standard . at first, the faculty of law schools wrote most of the 
articles, selected the rest, and oversaw the work of student contribu-
tors, who wrote “notes” or short articles on new legal developments, 
mainly recent judicial decisions . all that changed during the 1930s, 
when one law faculty after another decided to leave the selection and 
editing of all law review articles to student editors . this notorious 
abandonment of responsibility by law professors has always been a 
target for criticism . in a 1936 law review article, Yale law profes-
sor Fred rodell excoriated the quality of both the writing and the 
content of most law review articles4 . Many have echoed him since . 
Most recently, Justice John roberts, the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court, has said : “Pick up a copy of any law review that you see and 
the first article is likely to be, you know, the influence of immanuel 
Kant on evidentiary approaches in 18th-century Bulgaria, or some-
thing, which i’m sure was of great interest to the academic that 
wrote it, but isn’t of much help to the bar”5 . this and an array of 
similar judicial dismissals of the law review literature are collected 
in a recent New York times article that may be of greater influence 
than the eminent judges it quotes . adam Liptak concluded in this 
article that : “the general debate on how to improve law reviews 
is an old one, and there is little prospect of change . Law reviews 
4 . F . rodell, “Goodbye to Law reviews”, 23 Virginia L. Rev. 38-45, 
November 1936 .
5 . a . Liptak, The Lackluster Reviews That Lawyers Love to Hate, New York 
times, October 21, 2013 .
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will continue to publish long, obscure and dated articles, and their 
readership and influence will continue to drop”6 .
Not only are US law reviews reviled for their irrelevance, but 
it is also characteristic for them to publish only articles of much 
greater length than academic legal journals of other countries nor-
mally publish . Often, these long articles propose a framework for 
the core argument that is as complex and difficult to present as the 
primary argument . that is because the shared aspiration of so many 
such articles is to “break the mold”, to be a “game changer” in an 
area that may itself not be widely recognized to have a status quo 
against which the article’s novelty can be measured . this pretentious-
ness is no doubt a consequence, to some extent, of the role articles 
play in the “tenure process,” the crucial evaluation of junior faculty 
for permanent retention on a faculty .
iv. Absence of treatises
the disappearance of scholarly treatises must surely strike most 
legal academics and practicing lawyers from other jurisdictions as 
among the most peculiar features of the US legal scene . it would 
have surprised many in this country only a few years ago to be told 
that treatises were about to disappear, like dinosaurs in an ancient 
ice age .
the term “legal treatise” is used by my countrymen to refer to 
more than one kind of compendious book with legal subject matter . 
the term covers generally any book that surveys an entire area of 
the law . Now that the law in all countries that have highly developed 
legal systems has attained a high degree of complexity, the subject 
matter of a treatise can be only a small part of what would once 
have been itself a relative specialized area of the law . For example, 
the law of products liability, once a small part of tort law in the 
common-law countries, is now so highly developed and elaborate 
that it no longer makes sense to treat it as a subtopic of the earlier 
field that spawned it .
US treatises, however, fall into three fundamental categories . the 
older category is that once dominated by academic writers and often 
dedicated to emerging or less obvious general areas of law . among 




on admiralty law and by Boris Bittker and James eustace on corpo-
rate tax law7 . Other treatises were and still are sponsored by com-
mercial legal publishers and usually written by non-academic authors . 
the quality of this second category is mixed, although some are of 
excellent . the third category includes shorter treatises written primar-
ily by academic authors and intended to serve as “hornbooks” or 
supplementary texts for specific law school courses ; these usually 
do not attempt to cover an entire legal area but only the selected 
portions of an area that can practicably be covered in a one- or two-
semester law course . examples include Joseph Singer’s treatise on 
property law8 and William Stoebuck and Dale Whitman on property 
law9 . this last category are not works of serious scholarly ambition 
but are understood by their audience to be selective not only in their 
coverage of topics but also in their reporting of cases and statutes .
v. Conspicuous parts of us legal research
the reader may reasonably anticipate that a more detailed view 
of what goes on in a country’s legal literature should be organized 
into subject or topic areas . if divisions of that sort were clearly vis-
ible in the US literature, a survey could easily reflect them . in fact, 
both subject matter and research methods must be mentioned in order 
to give a useful overview here . the methodology of legal reasoning 
is not at issue . For example, the law-and-economics movement has 
only occasional and controversial relevance to court decisions and the 
interpretative work of jurists, although it looms large in law reviews . 
the same is true of the current vogue for empirical and especially 
statistical methods of legal argumentation in law reviews – this is not 
reflected in the work of judges or practitioners ; neither are glean-
ings from cognitive science or behavioral economics . indeed, the 
most natural place to begin the present survey is with schemes of 
research that are not confined to one or a few subject areas .
7 . G . Gilmore and C . Black, The Law of Admiralty, New York, Foundation 
Press, 1975 ; Boris Bittker and James eustace, Federal Income Taxation of 
Corporations and Shareholder, Boston, Warren, Gorham & Lamon, 2000, now listed 
as [“with the collaboration of Gersham Goldstein”] .
8 . J . Singer, Property, Boston, aspen, 3d ed . 2009 .
9 . W . B . Stoebuck and D . a . Whitman, Law of Property, New York, 
Foundation Press, 3d ed . 2000 .
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Of these, until recently, the most prominent were law-and-econom-
ics and various types of “critical” legal theory . exponents of both 
of these self-consciously systematic approaches held themselves out 
initially as inimical to each other – economic analysis was thought 
to dispel the apparent relevance of interest group politics on the law, 
while critical theory purported to expose the deeply rooted relevance 
precisely of class and group interests . the heyday of this opposition, 
however, has passed . even the principal spokespersons of the now 
venerable Critical Legal Studies movement have begun to declare it 
irrelevant to current debates10 . Other critical approaches have also 
begun to lose steam and to soften the defiant tone that was for-
merly characteristic of them11 . “L & e,” as the law and economics 
movement is known to legal academics, has not disappeared but has 
lost its oppositional character and become politically neutral : it has 
prominent proponents on both the right and the left12 .
Statistical methods, in the US as elsewhere, now enjoy great 
prestige in academic legal research agenda13 . What is most notable 
about the US version of this phenomenon is the influence it has 
had on how criminal and administrative law is investigated (study 
of stops, richard Parker) . Criminal law, in particular, once attracted 
very little academic interest . in the US, criminal law is overwhelm-
ingly the product of state legislatures, not of Congress . Local varia-
tions and the more modest level of expertise and skill exhibited by 
state legal codes have made it less interesting to researchers, not to 
mention the comparative rarity of problems of interpretation raised 
by criminal statutes . Statistical methods are also being applied here 
10 . D . Kennedy, “Form & Substance in Private Law adjudication”, 89 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1685, 1976 ; M . tushnet, “New Forms of Judicial review and the Persistence 
of rights and Democracy-Based Worries”, 38 Wake Forest Law Review 813 (2003) .
11 . r . Delgado, Critical Race Theory: An Introduction, NYU Press, 2d edition 
2012 ; P . Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights, Cambridge, Mass ., Harvard 
U . Press, 1991 .
12 . L . Kaplow, “Discounting Dollars, Discounting Lives : intergenerational 
Distributive Justice and efficiency”, 74 University of Chicago Law Review 79, 
2007 ; S . M . Shavell, “Strict Liability versus Negligence”, 9 Journal of Legal 
Studies 1, 1980 ; P . Siegelman and t . Baker, “the Law & economics of Liability 
insurance”, in J . arlen (ed .), Research Handbook in the Economics of Tort, 
Cheltenham, UK, edward elgar, 2013 ; t . Ulen, “the economics of tort Defenses”, 
in J . arlen, (ed .), The Law and Economics of Tort Liability, Cheltenham, UK, 
edward elgar, 2011 ; r . Posner, “Statutory interpretation – in the Classroom and 
in the Courtroom”, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev . 800, 1983 .
13 . See, e .g ., H . e . Jackson et al., Analytical Methods for Lawyers, New York, 
Foundation Press, 2nd ed ., 2011 .
StePHeN UtZ
208 bruylant 
to employment law14, law reviews themselves,15 welfare law16, law 
practice and ethical issues17, banking and consumer credit law18 . in 
the recent hiring season for new law professors, a disproportionate 
fraction of job candidates presented work that employed statistical 
methods .
But statistical reasoning is not suited to many complex policy 
issues . in the field of tax policy, for example, it is difficult to see 
how the necessary simplifications of null hypotheses and assump-
tions about the independence of variables can be adapted to questions 
about the economic distortions caused by highly flexible tax rules 
for changes in corporate form, for the amortization of investments 
in intangibles, and so forth . early writers on political economy – 
ricardo, Say, McCullough, Mill – devoted roughly one-third of the 
lengths of their ground-breaking books to income taxation, and this 
was no accident . the scope but also the uncertain empiricality of 
modern economics developed naturally only when the viewpoint of 
the public and not only that of autocratic sovereigns first became 
relevant to the problems of public finance .
although modern economics is certainly not the only discipline 
that should or does influence tax policy today, it is still the most 
highly developed tool the area has at its disposal, and the pecu-
liar resistance of economic theory to empirical testing has not been 
changed by the growth in number and inventiveness of empirical 
economics . in the US, the National Bureau of economic research 
is the most important umbrella group and promoter of macroeco-
nomic research . it maintains a database of working papers and more 
formally published work and commissions experts to summarize the 
research projects and results of individual economists . While only a 
fraction of the NBer’s work focuses on tax-related issues, it is a 
very large fraction . the data-driven portion of this fraction points 
out intriguing but usually inconclusive correlations between economic 
14 . S . S . Pandya and P . Siegelman, “Underclaiming and Overclaiming”, 
38  Law and Social Inquiry 836-862, 2013 .
15 . a . Yaphe, “taking Note of Notes : Student Legal Scholarship in theory 
and Practice”, 62 J. Leg. Ed. 259, 2012 .
16 . K . S .Gustafson, Cheating Welfare : Public Assistance and the 
Criminalization of Poverty, New York, NYU Press, 2012 .
17 . L . C . Levin, “Guardians at the Gates : the Backgrounds, Career Paths 
and Professional Development of Private U .S . immigration Lawyers”, 34 Law & 
Social Inquiry 399, 2009 .
18 . P . McCoy, “a Behavioral analysis of Predatory Lending”, 38 Akron L. 
Rev. 725, 2005 .
a PerSONaL rePOrt ON MetHODOLOGiCaL DeVeLOPMeNtS iN US LaW
 bruylant 209
phenomena and tax rates, adjustments to tax bases, and tax design 
generally . in comparison with these studies, bolder model-building 
projects, of which the most prominent by far is optimal tax theory, 
have a greater influence on policy debates, precisely because they 
speak in more general terms and offer hypotheses about broad tax 
design choices19 . On the whole, broad theoretical work is of greater 
relevance than small-scale empirical studies to scholarly discussions 
of tax policy . to the extent that US legislators in Congress or at the 
state level pay any attention to fact or theory, they are also more 
likely to respond to broad design advice than to incremental and 
tentative findings, even though only the latter are directly based on 
empirical data . accordingly, US tax law journals are still dominated 
by narrow discussions of existing law and theoretical discussions 
without evidence-based foundations .
One notable development in US academic research is a new inter-
est in statutory interpretation . it must first be said that any activity 
at all in this area is a significant change from what has been a 
longer period of stagnation . at infrequent intervals, great names in 
american law, like Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr ., John Chipman 
Gray, Justice Benjamin Cardozo, edward Levy, and Lon Fuller, have 
published brief discussions of the major problems raised by prec-
edent and the common law . On the whole, their contributions have 
been elementary or even superficial, offering not much more than 
a restatement of the obvious puzzle : whatever claims of fidelity 
to precedent judges may make, is there any reality to the supposed 
continuity of judge-made law that is not itself subject to articulate, 
independent standards ? Most lawyers in this country are satisfied 
with ronald Dworkin’s account of the continuity as comparable to 
that of a game in which the players each write a chapter of a novel, 
without first agreeing on its plot, able only to see the previous chap-
ters20 . the weakness of this account lies in the fact that the players 
of such a game, and common-law judges, can of course do whatever 
they please, as long as they maintain some sort of continuity : each 
player may otherwise feel found by a different standard or even 
consider herself bound by no standard at all . in brief, the existing 
19 . S . Utz, Tax Policy : An Introduction and Survey of the Principal Debates, 
Minneapolis, Minnesota, West Publishing Co . 1993, ch . 13 .




literature on legal methodology in this country has itself been exhib-
ited a relatively superficial continuity .
Some recent writers, however, devote their attention exclusively 
to statutory interpretation, sidestepping the broader discussion of 
the common-law method and instead taking its basic features for 
granted21 . Notably, Professor William eskridge of Yale Law School 
argued for “dynamic statutory interpretation,” making somewhat more 
precise a theme that is not new to the legal academy but had not 
previously been singled out for close examination22 .it is that statu-
tory interpretation should be governed above all by the purpose of 
the statute in question, in an appropriately wide sense of the word 
“purpose,” which may vary with context . a court’s reading of a 
statute that sets forth the rights of landlords and tenants should be 
sensitive to whether the legislature wanted to preserve the quality 
of the rental housing stock or to safeguard the parties’ intentions . 
Separately, Scott Brewster and ernest Weinrib, both at Harvard Law 
School, have engaged in an elaborate debate about the analogical 
reasoning in the common law23 . Brewster, trained in philosophy, 
proposed that what is often described as analogical reasoning from 
precedent is better understood as “abduction” from specific fact pat-
terns to be brought under a single rule . Weinrib argued that there are 
other varieties of analogical reasoning to be found in familiar parts 
of the common law . Neither, however, addresses the elastic scope 
of the term “analogy,” or considers its possible over-use by the few 
legal methodologists in the older US legal literature24 .
approaching the problem of method from a different angle, legal 
scholars have recently highlighted problems raised by the lawyerly 
tradition, perhaps in all common-law jurisdictions but at least in the 
US, of misreading referentially opaque language in statutes and other 
legal materials . Philosophers and linguists, since the late 19th cen-
tury, have noted and attempted to explain more fully how words 
function when they follow certain types of verbs, especially those 
21 . J . Scott, “Codified Canons and the Common Law of interpretation”, 
98  Geo. L. J. 331, 2010 .
22 . W . eskridge, A Republic of Statutes : The New American Constitution, 
Yale University Press, 2010 .
23 . S . Brewster, “exemplary reasoning : Semantics, Pragmatics, and the 
rational Force of Legal argument by analogy”, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 923, 1996 ; 
L .  L . Weinreb, Legal Reason : The Use of Analogy in Legal Argument, Cambridge, 
england, Cambridge U .P ., 2005 .
24 . Utz, 2012, pp .  300-307 .
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that express the content of mental states or rely on such content 
for their truth value . “i’m looking for a dog” is ambiguous because 
the speaker may be looking either for a particular dog or for any 
dog at all . Medieval logicians had already labeled this feature of 
descriptive language by calling the first sort of meaning de dicto 
and the second de re25 . Many languages, like French, set apart some 
or all linguistic contexts in which words are used de dicto and not 
de re by the use of the subjunctive mode of the verb within these 
contexts . For example, “Je veux que tu me rendes mon pull” means 
that i want you to return the sweater i consider mine, even if there 
is no such thing26 .
One of the foremost exponents of current american method-
ological research, who uses linguistic and logical research tools, is 
Professor Jill anderson . She has pointed out a pattern of word-by-
word interpretation by courts that overlooks aspects of the mean-
ing of sentences that would be obvious to nontechnical speakers of 
english27 . For example, she analyzes the repeated judicial misinter-
pretation of the americans With Disabilities act, which prohibits 
discrimination against the disabled . the act defines disability as the 
impediment of “one or more life functions” of the individual . Courts 
have definition to imply that they cannot find a defendant’s conduct 
to be discriminatory on the basis of disability, unless the plaintiff can 
prove that the defendant discriminated with respect to a particular 
life function of the plaintiff that is impaired . thus, a defendant’s 
admitted discrimination against an individual on the grounds that she 
“was disabled” would not be actionable . it cannot be said of such 
misinterpretation that it is even excessively literal, since no ordinary 
user of english would interpret the statute in this way . Similarly, 
Professor anderson has criticized the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of the word “any” in Coraco Pharmaceutical Labs v. Novo Nordisk,28 
on the grounds that the Court mistook the limiting function of that 
word by mistakenly treating it as having the same meaning as the 
definite article, when the word can in fact mean some one thing 
among many of a certain kind . the fallacy in the Court’s reasoning 
25 . P . Geach, Reference and Generality: An Examination of Some Medieval 
and Modern Theories, Cornell Univ . Press 1962 .
26 . J .-P . Sartre, L’Être et le Néant. Essai d’ontologie phénoménologique, 
Paris, Éditions Gallimard, 1943 .
27 . J . anderson, “Just Semantics : the Lost readings of the americans with 
Disabilities act”, 117 Yale L.J. 992, 2008, p .  210 .
28 . 132 S . Ct . 1670, 566 US − (S . Ct . april 17, 2012) .
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is that highlighted in Sartre’s observation concerning de dicto and de 
re utterances, discussed in the previous paragraph .
vi. Conclusion
Despite the absence of a broad tradition of methodological study 
among US legal scholars, the modest literature by my compatriots on 
distinctive issues of legal interpretation has grown markedly in quan-
tity and quality over the last two decades . Contributors to this lit-
erature have identified previously unnoticed methodological puzzles, 
and their proposed analyses of these puzzles have begun to exercise 
a notable influence on judges, practicing lawyers, and the scholarly 
world . the prominence of american Legal realism, the pedagogical 
Legal Process Movement, and the more recent Critical Legal Studies 
Movement formerly distracted attention from narrowly framed ques-
tions of legal interpretation, coordination, and renovation . this may 
have contributed to the fall in prestige of legal treatises and law 
reviews concerned with incremental changes in the law, the sort of 
legal development that is of greatest concern to the bench and the 
bar . Prompted by idiosyncracies of statutory interpretation, however, 
a new generation of methodologists have found these narrow ques-
tions interesting and have begun to propose analytical responses to 
them that may change the course of judicial interpretation in par-
ticular cases, while also alerting practicing lawyers and scholars that 
some of their most deeply rooted instincts, carefully cultivated in 
traditional law-school instruction, are due for re-examination and, 
in some instances, correction . the methodological toolbox of these 
new scholars includes empirical methods, especially, those borrowed 
from the social sciences, as well as economic, linguistic, and logi-
cal modes of analysis . as a consequence of this turn of events, it 
may be hoped that courts and law schools alike will focus more 
consciously on core questions of interpretation and of the systemic 
coherence of US law .
